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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PARLEY D. BfLLS, 
l'laintiff and Appellant 
v,_ 
'THE DENVl<JR & RIO GRANDE.: 
"\VESTBHK R.~ILROAD COM-
PANY, a corporation, 
Defendant nnd Respondent. 
BHJJ;_~F OF APPELLANT 
Case K o. 9028 
STAT.F~M.K~'I' OF THE CA:-lE 
A. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties are referred to fl::< in the court 1Jelow. 
All italks are ours. 
Parley D. Bill::;, wa:o injured while engaged in the 
performance of his duties as conductor on the 20th day 
of April, 1955, when he was thrown to the floor oi tlw 
caboose on defendant's freight train Extra #5501 East, 
as said train 1m~ moving along defendant's east bound 
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mainline track at .Provo, "Ctah' (R' :!, 4, J~:2, J39). 
Plaintiff filed his complaint in the Third J ndicial 
District Court in and lor Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, on the 21st day of March 1958, alhoging that he 
was an employee of The Denver & Rio Grande Western 
ltailroad Company, a corporation; that he suffered cer-
tain injmies while in the course of his employment, that 
his action was governed by the Federal J<::mployers' 
Liability Act, 45 r.S.C.A. Section 51, et seq. and that 
his injuries ·were caused in whole or in part by defend-
ant's negligence in subjecting the caboose to an unusually 
violent jerk, and to a jerk that was not reasonably to 
be expected by plaintiff. Plaintiff further alleged negli-
gence on the part of defendant by virtue of the doctrine 
of' Hes Ipsa Loquitur (R. 1, 2, and 3). 
Defendant, by its answer, admitted its corporate 
existence, admitted that plaintiff's action was filed pur-
suant to the Federal Bmployers' Liability Act, and 
denied the other allegations of plaintiff's complaint 
(R. 4). 
The case was tried before the Honorable Martin lL 
Larson commencing on the 1st day of December, 1958. 
The jury returned a six to two vcrdic·t of no cause of 
adion (R. 58). Thereafter plaintiff filed a motion for 
new trial which wa..s denied and the notice of appeal 
wa.s filed on the 5th day of lllarch, 1959 (R. 60). 
rpon admitted facts the remedy afforded plaintiff 
is controlled by the Federal E1uployer.,;' Liability ~\.rt. 
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Partieular attention is called to 45 L.S.L'.A. Hection 51 
which establishes liability for injuries resulting "in whole 
or in part" from negligenee of the (·arrier, J!J F.S.C.A. 
Section 53 which provides that contributory negligence 
of an employee shall not bar recovet)" but shall only 
diminish the damages, and 45 U.H.C.A. Section 54 which 
abolishes assumption of risk a,.; a df'feme. 
B. 'l'HE F'ACTS 
Plaintiff was 48 years of age at tile time of hi~ 
injuries. He had worked continuously for defendant as 
a brakeman and condudor since September of 1921 
(It 117). On the 20th da~- of April, 1H55, he was assigned 
as conductor of an extra freight train seheduled to 
leave Salt Lake City at 3:J5 P.M. with its ultimate 
destination Helper, Utah. TilE' train consisted of a -±-unit 
diesel, 112 empties, S loads, and a cabooi\l' (R 120). 
The first stop 11as made at R-iverton, the next at Ameri 
C'an Hork, and the train arrived at Pr-ovo on the eastbound 
mainline traek at approximately 7 :00 P .P.L (R. 1 ~1, 1 :.!~). 
Plaintiff was riding the caboose. The stop waH "a ver~· 
normal, gentle stop" (R. 12-+). Thereafter plaintiff went 
to the yard offiC'e, delivered hi~ switch list and waybilh:, 
and obtained a Jist of the cars to be picked up at Provo 
(R. 125). He then advised head brakeman \\'onnaeotl 
and rear brakeman Serassio of the switehing which wa~ 
to take place and returned to the caboo~(· for the purpocrr 
of "·writing my train up" (R. 126). 
The tracks involved were as follmn;: The Pacrtbouml 
mainline track which extends in a general northerly-
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,<;outherlv direction· immediately to the ea8t of the east-
. ' bound mainline trark and adja<.·,ent thereto, the westbound 
mainline track; immediately to the east of the >ve;;t-
bound mainline track and adjacent thereto, the pocket 
lnv·k; immediately to the east of the pocket traek and 
numbered 1, :2, 3, 4, 5, G, 7, etc., and adjacent thereto, 
a series or stomge tr*·ks; connecting ihc south ends 
of the pocket track and tracks J, ~. :l, 4, 5, fi, I, etc. and 
extending in a northeasterly-southwesterly direction, a 
lead track which is referred to al.so a,<; a crossover 
where it proceeds across the we~tbound mainline track 
and connect::! to the eastbound mainline track (R. 1:2-±, 
125). 
The switching operation to be perrormed by plain-
tiff's crew was a~ follows: 30 cars IH'Je to be taken 
off the head end of the train and set out on one of the 
f!torage tracks heretofore mentioned. Other cars were 
to be picked up on track No. 1 and placed at the head 
end of the train (R. 122, 12.), 201). \Yonnacott and 
Serassio were to handle these final ~"·itching operations 
(H. :!~0). 
The ~top involved in the accident \Hls unneeessary. 
The rear of the train, including- the eahoo~r. could have 
been left on the east bound mainline track \1·hcre the 
original stop had been mn<k. The engine and head end 
ol' the train could have been cut off, moved ahead approxi-
mately 20 carlengths and backed U(:l't>~;:. the er·o~~OYt>r. 
'l'he necessar)' switching operations could then lmn: been 
performed, the engme and car~ moved forward across 
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the crossover and backed to a coupling with the re::;t o[' 
the train (R. 215, 216). 1f this proccdmc had been fol-
lowed the train could then have moved out of town 
without another stop. 
Krocscller, the engineer of plaintiff's e1·cw, admitted 
the la::;t stop was unneces::;ary and that the switching 
could have been accomplished without pulling the rear 
or the train down and stopping (lt. 303, 304, 303). lie 
also admitted that he had been adYised bcl'orehand that 
the last stop was to be made (R. 305). 
The brakemen, unbeknownst to plaintiff, neverthe-
less had the engineer pull the entire train which 1m~ 
over a mile in length, a di~tance o(' approximalelY :?II 
carlcngths and then brought the movement to a o:top, 
with the plaintiff loeatcd in the caboose doing his paper 
work (R. 215, 216, 236). At thi~ time it >l'a~ gell.inp: 
dark and the brakemen were using their lanterns for 
signalling (R. 23fJ). 
Although the evidence was in conflict on the w•int. 
defendant introduced expert testimony to the effect that 
such a movement and stop could not be made without 
severe slnek adion occurring at the rear or the train 
( [{. 305, 322). 
After the train had moved pm-:sihly 15 earlengths, 
plaintiff arose from his desk and stalied to wall' loward 
the rear end of the caboose. His purpose was to detenrtine 
whetl1er the rear brakeman had mounted the caboose and 
whether the switche~ were lined proper!.'" as they Wl'l"l' 
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leaving town. This ·wru; customary. Tl1e train \vas pro-
C€Cding approximately 5 or 6 mile:;: an hour (R. 127). 
Plaintiff described the stop as follows (R. 128): 
"A. \Vcll, when I got about fifteen feet from 
my desk the eahoose just stopped suddenly. There 
was no motion at all. \V e just stopped dead still 
and r was thrown backward onto the floor and 
.skidded along the floor until I hit the end of the 
rahoose. 
"Q. How far did you move from the place 
\d1ere you were located at the moment of this 
::;topf 
''A. Approximately fifteen feet." 
The stop was so violent that it threw all the papars 
and manifest sheets to the floor of the eaboose (R. 129). 
Plaintiff rurthcr testified that the amount of slack 
action ·was not in aceordance with cu,;tomary and safe 
railroading operation (R. 188, 189). 
On direct examination Wonnacott deR(·ribed the slack 
action as a "terrific run-in" (R. ~:2:1) and on ctws 
examination he te~tifi.ed as follows (R. 22-!): 
"Q. And slaek action, severe ~lack action in 
moves of thi~ kind is not at allnnu:sual, i~ iU 
"A. \Yell, I wouldn't ~ny that. Thi~ was a 
pretty severe one." (R. :226). 
Again he testified: ''\Yell, I don't think it ~hould 
have ('ome to that fast a stop." (R. 230). 
Serassio testified that he VlRS standing near wlwr<' 
the clearan('(' point would be and was ;;i.gnaling directly 
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to the engmeer (H. 24-l-). When the train reached tlw 
point ·where the stop was to be made he gave an ea:;y 
t;ign and then a stop sign. The cars stopped near ·when· 
he wanted them (R 237, 244). He did not remember hm\ 
close they ·were to the dearanec point (H. 245). 
He testified concerning the natnre of the :>top a~ 
follows: "\Vel!, it was severe. Severe." (R. 238). And 
again: "Q. As compared to the customary >~top or a 
train of this type, on this track with thi~ movement, 
was it severe or easy1 " * * A. 1 would :my it wa.;,; 
severe, yes." 
He further testified that at tlw time he gave the 
stop signal there remained plenty of room on the track 
for the train to have made an easy ;.;top (U.. 23D). 
'l'here was abundant evidence from which the JUr~· 
eould have found that thcYe wa,; no need for tl1e stop 
to have been so violent. 
The two air braking systPms which could have been 
used in stopping the train were the automatic, or tmi11 
hrakeo;, and the independent~ or engine brakes. The auto-
matic brakes apply brake preso:ure to the ·wheels on tlw 
entire train, including the engine and the caboose. 'l'lw 
independent brakes apply brake pres,;ure only to the 
wheels of the engine, and if there is sla<.'k in the train 
this slack will run in when o;aid brakes are used alonP 
(R 168). Plaintiff gave his opinion 1 hat the engineer 
had Uiled the independent rather than the autornatie 
brakes and that tlLis accounted for the violPnce of tlw 
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~lack action (R. 137,138, til9, Ji(i, 177, liS). 
W onmwott testified that in hi,-; opinion t}u: inde-
pendent rather than the train brake~ had been used. lle 
based his opinion on experience and the fact that the 
head end of the tralli seemed to ,;top all of a sudden 
before the cars did (R. 206, 230). 
\Vonnacott also testified that "he can apply the air 
where it gradually stops those cars" (R. 1:2li). 
Serassio was of the same opinion, testifying agam 
and again that j r the customary procednrf' of using the 
automatic rather than the independent air had been 
followed the stop would not have been so severe (R 
250, 251, 234, 2:17, 259, 282, 28:\). Serassio further tf'sti-
l"ied that he actually saw from the lack of piston travel 
that the independent rather than the automatic brakes 
had been used (R. 259). 
Plaintiff was not prepared for the ~lack action for 
two rea~:;ons. First, he thought the train wa~:; lea\-iug town. 
Second, he did not expect ,;lack action of the degree of 
violence that occurred. )i]ormal slack rwtion, in his opin-
ion, would not have caUiled him to be injured (R. 1::'1. 
128, 171). 
Following the accident plaintiff left the train. went 
to the yard office and reported hi~ injury. He then 
returned to the train and proceeded lo Thi~tle. a distance 
of approximately 20 mile», at whirh point he wa~ relieyed 
(R. 140, 1+1). He suffered a ruptured intervertebral 
di;;e 11hieh later required a fusion op02-ration with i'f'~nlt-
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ant permanent partial dio:ability (R 85, 8(), 81, SS). 
STATI<JMENT OF POJK'J'8 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR BY GIVUG INSTRUCTION NO. 20. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COl:RT COliil\UTTED PREJUDJ.CIAL 
ERROR BY GIVING 1:-.TSTRUCTION NO. 19. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDIOAL 
ERROR BY GIVING INSTRCCTION NO. 20. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT COJ'ITMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR BY GIVING I!'<STRUCTION KO. 23. 
POINT V. 
THE T.itiAL COURT COMMITTED PREHTDICIAI. 
ERROR BY GIVIKG INSTRUCTION NO. 24. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COlJRT COC\fMITTED PREJCDICIAL 
ERROR BY GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 21. 
POINT VII. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR WHEN IT STRUCK 'l'HF. Eh'TIRE TESTIMOKY 
OF THE WITNESS PAUL FRANK THOMAS. 
ARGUME~T 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR BY GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 25. 
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:For convenience of the Court, Tnstrudion :'\o. :23 lS 
herein set fortll: 
''l'lainti.ff in the exen·ise or reasoi1able care 
is required hy the saf<"ty rules of 'I' he Denver and 
Rio Grande Western Railroad Company to pro-
teet him~Plf again;;t injury a;:; far a~ possible fr?m 
jerks, slack action or any other unexpected motion 
by keeping a finn grip and a secure foothold 
when riding on or in moving equipment." 
Instruction No. 25 is defendant's requested Instruc-
tioH No. 9. CouTISC] for plaintiff made the following ex-
ception to f.laid instruction: 
"Plaintiff objects to the giving of Instruction 
~a. 25 on the grounds that it states that plaintiff, 
in the exercise of reasonable care, is required hy 
the safety rules of the Denver &. Rio Grande 
Railroad Company to protect himself against 
injury, as far as possible, from jerks, slack action, 
or any other unexpected motion by keeping a 
finn grip rutd secme foothold when rid.ing on 
moving equipment, on the grounds and for the 
reason that the plaintiff would not be required, 
under the law, to proteet. him."ell' against un-
expected motions of the 1ype indicated, and the 
rules of the company cannot be made contrary to 
the rules of law and become a ,;tandard of care 
to be imposed upon its own i!mployees, for the 
n:a;;on that it can be Pasily sctm that ."\Wit rule6 
could be made which would make them negligent 
regardless of what they did; and to say that they 
are negligent for not anticipating unexpected mo-
tions goes too far, and is an incorrect statement 
of the law.'' (R. 351, 352). 
In conjunction with Instruction ~o. 1.5 wlrieh re-
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quires plaintiff to expert the unc;,;pected ·we rall attention 
to Instruction .1\o. 17 (a) which allows the jury to find 
not only that plaintiff was contributorily negligent but 
that hi:; contributory negligCM'P was the sole proximate 
cause of his own injuriP~. 
'l'hr< lm\· i~ clear that it 1~ not negligence for one to 
fail to anticipate and guard against harm which can 
come solely through the negligent ads of another person 
or persons. 
See Brune1· v . .ilfcCaxthy, et aL, 105 Utah 399, 40G. 
142 P. 2d G49, where the court <dated: 
"'" " " Where the accident has been caused 
hy the failure to give ::<uch signal the party work-
ing in a crew responsible for such omission ·will 
not be heard to say that the injury suffered eould 
have been avoided had the injured party con-
ducted himself on thP. assumption that the signal 
would not be given; that the consequence,: of the 
delict could have been avoided had the injured 
party, as avpears from hindsight, so conducted 
or positioned himself as to make the delict. incon-
;,equential" 
And in MathetDS v. Daly West M-ining Co., 2./ L-tah 
193,75 P. 722 (1904), the court stated: 
"It io: also ·well settled that the negligence of 
the master is not among the risks so assumed by 
the servant. Therefore when the servant, in the 
discharge of his duti.es, is in a position which is, 
under the conditions which then exist, naturally 
safe, but is suddenl;.· made dangerom; by the 
negligence of the master, and the injury to the 
servant is immediately caused thereby, the master 
.l.bl" Js m e. 
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In McCulloch 1:. Horto-n, (~1ont.), 56 P. 2d 1344, 
tbe court stated: 
"'T'lrc failur·e to anticipate negligence which 
results in injury is not negligence and will not 
defeat the action for the injury sustained. 20 
R.C.L. 118: Central Railroad Co. v. De Buslcy 
(C.C.A.) 261 F. 561; Wagner v. Philadelphia 
Rapid Transit Co., 252 Pa. 354-, 97 A. 411; ::\ orth 
Bend Lumber Co. v. Seattle, 116 Wash. 500, 199 
P. 9RS, 19 A.L.R. 415." 
Tn GnJenwood L Summers, et al., (Cal.) 149 P. 2d 
35, the eourt recognized the rule in the following lan-
guage: 
''The general rule is that every person who 
i~ himself exercising ordinary rare has a right 
to preomme that every other person will perform 
his duty and obey the law, and in the absence of 
reasonable ground to think otherwise it is not 
negligence to assume that he is not exposed to 
danger whirh comes to him only from violation 
or law or dtlly by such other person. See Harris 
v. Johnson, 1916, 1'7! Cal. 55, 5~. 161 P. 1155, 
L.R.A. 1917C, 477, Ann. Ca.s. 19l~K 560: Pinelln 
v. Taylor, 1933, US ·Cal. App. 508, 51:?, 17 P. ~d 
1039." 
See also Piue!lo n. Taylor (Cal.) 17 P. :.'d 1039, 
Bowers. et u.1·. r. Foster ct ux., ("Wash.) ~OS P. 107:!; 
Beck v. Sirot.a (Cal.) 109 P. :?d H9; and Hechler rt al r. 
McDonnell, (Cal.) 109 P. 2d ±:!G. 
The primary vice of Instruction Xo. :23 is that plain-
til'£ is required to anticipate and guard against all un-
~''>Pl'eli•\1 jerks, regardless of their origin or severity. 
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Even tlwugh smooth operation would normally be ex-
pected, and a jerk orrm·<>, plaintiff mu~t 1''-J1f-'r:t the jerk 
because an operating rule ol' the Denver & Hio Grande 
Hailroad Co. so decrees. lle must expect a stop from a 
sudden failure of equipment., a holt of lightning, or tl1e 
negligent act of a fellow employee because the railroad 
has a rule to that effect. And if he dorsn 't expect the 
~tnexpected he 1~8 negligent as a matter of law. Even 
though a reasonably prudent pcr~on under the circum-
stances would not expect a jerk, this paintiff must expect 
a jerk because his employer has enacted a rule. This if' 
the first case to our knowledge in which a trial eourt 
has ever permitted a railroad company to repeal an act of 
Congress. And we call the Court's attention to the fact' 
th.at defense coun::;el led the trial court into this ridicu-
lous error with his Requested Instruction No. 9. 
Instruction ~o. :2.) al:-~o reviYP>< tlw outlawed defen~f· 
of assumption of risk. 
In the year 1939 Congress amended the Wederal 
Employers' Liability Art and abolished the dod r·ine ol' 
assumption of r·i;.;k as a dcfe11;.;e . .J-J r.S.C.A. Section J~ 
read8 as follows: 
"§34. A"'::mmption of ri8ks of employment.. 
In any action brought against any common carrier 
under or by virtue of any of the provisions of 
this chapter to recover damages for injuries to, 
or the deatlt ol', any of its employees, such em-
plnyeP shall not he held to have assumed the risks 
of his employment in any case where such injury 
or death resulted in whole or in part from thP 
nr~digenre of any of the officer;;, agenJ, or em-
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ployees or such carrier; and no eu:ployee shall be 
held to have assumed lbe ri:,k::i of h1,.; employcment 
in anv case where the violation by such common 
carri~r of any siatutc enacted for tlJe safety of 
emplovees contributed to the injury or death of 
.:<11d1 Crnployec. ~\pr. ~2, 1908, c. 149 § 4, 3~. Stat. 
G6; Aug. 11, 19:39, c. 6Sfi § 1, 53 Stat. 1±0±. · 
'T'he leading case decided b~- the 1'nited Stales Su-
preme Court interpreting the a1JOve statute is Tiller 1:. 
Atlantic Coast LineR. Co., 318 L~- S. 34, KT L. Ed. 610, 
fm S. Ct. 44~, '\·herein the hackgroTIJld of the doctrine of 
assumption of risk is discussed and the court concludes 
in the following historic language; 
.. 'l'he doctrine of asswnption of risk cannot be 
'abolished i11 toto' and still remain in partial 
existance as the court below suggest.;. The theory 
that a servant i~ completely barred from reeovery 
for injury resulting from his master's negligence, 
which legislatures have sought to eliminate in all 
it~ yarious forms of contributor~· negligence, the 
fellow servant ruk, and assumption of risk, rnru;t 
nut, contrary to the 'A-ill of Congn'~~- be allowed 
recrudescence under an;- other label in the common 
law k-'>icon * * "' • ." 
A number of cases haYe followed the lead of the 
Tiller case, supra, in holding- the line agrunst efforts on 
the part of various lesser courts to limit and cireum-
seribe the intent of Congre~~ when it abolished the de-
·fense of a,gsumption of risk. We (•ite Thonw..s, Appellant, 
1', f!nio-11 Railuvi1J Company, _!ppcllee, (Sixt11 Cir. Oct. 
14, 1fl5--l-) 216 F. ~d 18, where the trial eourt attempted 
to eliminate recover~· by plaintiff if h.e knell' a.ud If!!-' 
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Hwurt of danger ercutcd by negligence of tiie defendant 
and even in that ::;ituation the appellate court reversPd 
and held that such knowledge on plaintiff'~ part wa:< 
not a defem;e under the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act. The court ::;tatcd: 
"The trial court charged the jury that the 
railroad \Vas not liable for injuries sustained 
from dangers that were obvious or as well known 
to the injured party as to the- railroad; and that 
if the jury found from the evidence a dangerous 
condition of the concrete floor near the foreman':; 
office, in the roundhouse, or deficient lighting" 
facilities in that place, 'if such dangerous condi-
tion exi::;ted, was obvious, or as well kno·wn to 
the plaintiff Thomas ao; to the railroad, the de-
fendant would not be liable for injury sustained 
from su<:h dangerous condition.' The foregoing 
charged the employee with assumption of risk. 
~'his was error, as 'every vestige of the doctrine 
of assumption of risk was obliterated from the 
law (the Federal Employers' Liability Act) by 
the 1939 amendment.' Tiller v. Atlantic Coast 
Line R. Co., 318 L<.S. 54, 58, 63 S. Ct. 444, 446, 
87 h Ed. 610. Even though the employee may 
know that the employer has been negligent in the 
furnishing of a safe place to work, the employee 
does not, under the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act, assume the risks of such danger. Williams v. 
Atlantic Coast LineR. Co., 5 Gir. 190 ]'. 2d 744, 
748.'' 
In Texas a.nd Pacific Railway Company v. Bnckles, 
(Sixth Cir. decided Apr. 6, 1956), 232 F. 2d 257, certior~ 
ary denied, 76 S. Ct.1052, defendant reque11ted an instruc-
tion in the following language: 
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"Where an l'tnployee or a eomntOn c:arrier_by 
railroad operating in interstate commc~ce fiiltt(·~­
patcs the risk resulting frorn tlw po~<nble negh-
g-cnce of a fellow employe1.', or should under the 
circmnstances anticipate such risk, and dceides 
to duuwc tlntt particular risk, he ennnot T"Ceover 
for an injury re~ulting from such negligence. 
Therefore, if you fim] that complainant antici-
pated, or should have anticipated, the impad re-
sulting from the coupling attempt and knew, or 
should have known, of the risk inherent in such 
an attempt and chanced that risk, your verdict 
mu;:.t be for the defendant." 
'rhe appellate court ~n~tained the trial court in refusing 
said instruction in the following language: 
"Specification 5 is that the trial court erred 
in refusing to give o;peeial charge 8 requested by 
defendant. In the case relied on by appellant, 
Owens v. T:nion Pacific Railway Co., footnote 6, 
supra, the Supreme ·Court spoke of what remained 
of the defense of assumption risk prior to the 
1939 amendment to the Federal Employrro;' Lia· 
billty Act abolishing that defemP. now ..j.;) e.s.c .• \.. 
§54. The accident in that ease occurred before 
the enactment of that a111endment, but :<nit \\"ll.~ 
brought flrtenuuds. B.r that amendment 'e-.ery 
vestige of the doctrine of ass11mption of risk was 
obliterated .from the law.' ~'iller v. A-lnan!ic Coa,;l 
Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 58, G3 S. ("(. ill. 446, 87 
L. Ed. GlO. Charge ~ was, then•!'ore, properly 
refused." 
In Joh11son !'. F:ril:' Railroad Compa11y, (2 Cir. de· 
cided Oct. 6, 1956) 236 F. 2d ;;52, tJw court. faced \Yith 
a problem sinrilar to !hat in the CH6P at bar, stated: 
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"ln addition, we think the court stated Uw 
is;,ue of contributory negligence to the jury in 
:;uch terms that it might be thought that as;,ump-
tion or the ri::;k was a good defense, contrary to 
45 l~.S.C.A. §54. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line 
R Co., :318 C.S. 54, 63 S. CL 444, 87 L. Ed. 610. 
The relevant portion of the charge was as follows: 
"'Now, as to the question of contributory 
negligence, ·which ha::; been talked a1Jout in this 
case: Owen ,Johnson had been working part time, 
it is true, but he had been doing this job befor!:'. 
ls there anything thai he did at the tirne that 
contributed to it·! H c knew what his cowJition ·was. 
Ile testified that U1e slightest bang on this bone 
might bo an aggravation of this condition. He 
dairn~ he ·wasn't warned and that that violated 
their rule by not warning him. But Del Guidice, 
his own witness, Jbtified that it was a nonnal 
coupling that happened every night, and pre::;wn, 
ably every night the.~- didn't ><tov to warn hiw 
herfmse it was so gentle that nobody \VUfl pushed 
around. _\t least, you will be entitled to infer 
that from t11e h·.~timony of Del Oudire.' 
''From this it might. have been thought tlw.t 
it was permissible to inler that. be('ause on other 
occa.'lions when the plaintiff was at work the 
locomotive crew did not warn the ma.il ear oecu-
panb, the plaintilf had a~surncd the risk>\ of an 
unexpeetcd eoupling of normal force. The specific 
cxf.'eption to thiil passage ·wa~ well taken.'' 
The magnitude of the error committed by the trial 
court in giving Instmction No. 25 becomes apparent upon 
a moment of reriertion. If, b.1 enarting an operating 
rulE', 1he railroad company could immuni7.e it~(·lf against 
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act;; whieh otherw-ise \\·ouhl be negligem~e, it conld effec-
tively eliminate all rights ut recovery hy railroad em-
ployees which have been :;o jealously guarded hy our 
LTniled States Supreme ·Coul't and other appt>llatc conrU 
in recent ye.ars. For p_xample, a milroad could enact a 
rule thai. emJlloyec:; should g-uard again~t and Pxped 
ummfc hflml brake,;, and tlm~ prevent recove1;.- for viola-
tion of the hand brake provisions ol' the Safety Appliance 
Act. A similar rule <'ould be enacted to immunize the 
railroad against UJI,'" conceivabl(' nq~ligence or violation 
of the Safety Appliance Acts by a railroad company. 
lYe do not believe that the Supreme Court of this 
~tate will ever ~erionsl;.- entertain establi,;hing a preced-
Pnt that would in effeet delegate to railroad companies 
tbe power to modify, or circumvent the established law 
of the land simply by enactment of an operating rule. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR BY GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. l'!l. 
For ('onvenien<>e of the Court Tn:::tnwtion Xo. 19 is 
herein set forth: 
Ino;tru('tion Xo. 19 
''You are instructed that <'Ouplers between 
railroad ear~ of necessity have ~<orne pia_,. or free 
action between them whi(·h result;:. in ;:.mne jerking 
01· jarring pf the ear.~ whenever they are stopped 
or started or 1 he ~peed of their lUOYf'luent ('han!l;ed, 
an~ t~i~ slaek ac!ion may occur even though -the 
tntm 1s operated m a <'areful and prudent mannPr. 
'l.'he plain1 iff cannot. therPfore, re<'O\'f'r any 
damages in this artion unless he pruYes Jw a 
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['l"I'\HIJidNanee of the evidence that the train of 
,·ar~ on which he \HI>< riding when he claims to 
have fallen in the rahoo~e >nt,.; operated in such 
a manner as to eau~e an unexpected jarring or 
jerkin;; of unusual and unnecesr:.ar)· iOcvcrilv and 
that he wa~ caused to fall in the caboose b~· such 
unexpected, unusual jarring or jerking of the 
caboose." 
lt will be noted that [nstrnrtion :\o. liJ is defendant'~ 
rPqne~ted Instruction .1\o. 1. Counsel for plaintiff ex-
rppted to o;aid in,.;lnwtion in the rollowing language: 
"" ~ ' ~ by this instruction the ronrt rPJ"tnires 
the jury to find that the jarring or ,jerking ·was 
hoth nnexpeded and unsually and unnecessarily 
\·iolcnt; and under the law, either an unexpected 
jarring or an unusual and unnecP.ssary severity 
'i\·ould be sufficif'nt for recovf'ry by plaintiff." 
Counsel also citf'd the case of Ayres r. The Union 
Pacific Railroad Compam1 (dceided .Jan. f:i, 1941) 111 
nah 104, 176 P. :!d 161 (R. 347). 
'l'hf' f'rror contained in lnst.ruction No. 19 can best 
he ~een by rderence tu certain faets esta!Jlished by the 
t>videnec in the case. Attention is called to the testimony 
of plaintiff, -Wonnacott and Sera~sio t.hat the ~lack action 
and resulting jerk of the caboose was unmmally and 
unneceso:arily Revere (R 128. 129, ~2:1, 226, 230, 237, 
2:1~. 2--1---1-, 245), and that said ~Pverity wa~ aecounted for 
by the engineer using the independent rather than the 
automatic brakes. And engineer Kroescher testifif'd that 
tl~e of thP independent brnlms for this kind of stop was 
nt>ithPr rustomary nor proper. 
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'i'he Ayre8 case, supra, and the ease of Missouri rae. 
R. Co. t:. Keeton, ;20/ Ark. 793, Ul3 S. W. :2d 505, 326 
U.S. 689, 66 S. Ct. 135, Rhmd for tlJe proposition that 
either of two different kind;; of jerks or stops will ·war-
rant a finding of negligence on the part of a railroad 
company, the first being a stop which is not reasonably 
to be expected in the light of the circumstances surround-
ing the movement, and tlte second being a stop which, 
even if expected, iB unusually and unnecessarily <iolent. 
This court, in the Ayres case, stated: 
'·The case of Missouri Pac. R.. Co. v. Keeton, 
207 Ark. 793, 18:> S. W. 2d 505; Keeton v. Thomp-
son, :326 U.S. 689, 66 S. {'t. 1:-!3, i~ one of tlte 
latest caser; on the subject. In that case there 'ra~ 
a confliei between the parties as to whether or 
not there \\ tb a sudden jerk at or about the time 
of the coupling. The k~timony that there was, 
re.,;ted almost entirely upon statements or the de-
ceased that there waR a Rudden hard <~top and he 
waR jerked off. The <~top wa~ characterized as 
one of the harde,;t tl1e witnes~ had ~een. '!'he 
Arkan,.;rt;; Supreme Court refused to ~ubmit the 
m;;e to the jury. 'l'lie Supreme Court of the Pnited 
State~, however, held that there was sufficient 
to go to the jury. eomparing that case with fh( 
present it is probably fair to say that a sudden 
stop ur .ierk at o timr n-hrn ·'·nwnlh motion i:o· to 
IJe anticipated- ,as in the prestnt case_ ;_,. et·r11 
worse tban u l1ord -'tnp at or neat· the time a sfnp 
of 8(11!1t kind is to be mlfiripatPd.'' 
\Vherc Jlw trial eourt n~1uired "an unexpected jar-
ring or jerking- of unusual and unnece~;;a 1T ~pn•rih" . . , 
the burden wn~ placl?d upon the plaintiff of eRtabli~hing 
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not nnh· that the ~top ·was unu6ually and unnecessarily 
severe, hut that no ;.,(op wa~ reasonably to be expected 
by plaintiff. An cx_peded stop could be of the seve-rest 
nature imaginable, and could 1Je cam;ed by the gravest 
kind of neglect, hut plaintiff still couldn't recover under 
this im;truction. 
Instruction )J"o. ]9 practieally arnounted to a dir-
ected verdict when eonsidcred in the light of the unrair 
written statement obtained from plaintiff shorly after 
the accident where appear the following ·words: "Some-
times they cut them in before we pull up, so when the 
start is made ·we ;just continue out. of town, and other 
1 inK~s they handle it in the manner done on this datf'. 
Either way is proper and usual." See J-<jxhibit 12. 
"\"\Thether or not plaintiff expected the stop could 
only go to his contributory negligence which is not a 
defense. See PadVlla r. Alchi't'l,son, T. & S. Ry. Co., (1!l56) 
295 P. 2d ]023, 61 ~- Jl.f. 115; Thomas, Appelant, v. Union 
Railway Company, Appellee, fmpra. Rut in Instruction 
:\'o. 19, where the court 15tates that plaintiff can recover 
nothing unleRo: the stop was unexpected, the words "in 
11·hole or in part" are eliminated from the Federal Em-
ployers Liability i'l_ct and the do<:trinc of contributor~r 
• rl<!'/ IV<td 
neghgencc is ,rQVHlwed as a eDmplete defense. Furiher-
rnore, Instruction X o. 19 reviw~s the doctrine of a~sump­
tion of risk as a complete' dei'cnse wherever and when-
ever a stop of o:ome kind should be ·expPderl. 
The instruction also eliminates plaintirf's right to 
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recover if the stop, although normal, \\Tas not rea~onabl~ 
to be expected. 1t will be recalled that plaintiff a,.;sumed 
the train wa,.; leaving town, and started for the rear of 
the caboose. A jury could find that this assumption 
wa~ reasonable in view of other evidence that a ~econd 
stop would involve excessive and Ullllecessary slack 
action. Certainly plaintiff was entitled to aso;ume tlrnt 
his fellow employees would not subject him to an unreas-
onable risk of harm. 
POINT Ill. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PR~JUDICIAL 
ERROR BY GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 20. 
l!'or convenience of the Court Instruction Ko. 20 
is herein set forth: 
Instruction K o. 20 
"Slack action is an ordinary and usual inci-
dent in the handling of freight trains. There-
fore, the fact that there was slack action, -even 
though it may have been severe, at the time of 
plaintiff's injury, does not in and of itself estab-
lish negligence on the part of the Railroad. Before 
you can find the Railroad negligent, you must 
find by a preponderance of the evidence that tlw 
engineer failed to make an ordinary, nonnal and 
reasonable stop when he- acted on the signal of 
the brakeman Serassio." 
Instruction No. 20 is defendant's requested Instruc-
tion 1'\o. 16. This instruction confines plaintiff e-xclusive· 
ly to the manner in whirh the engineer made the sto}l 
when "he acted on the signal of the brakeman Serassio,'' 
and eliminates plaintiff'~ contention that the making of 
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the :otop at all o:ould have been found by the jury to be 
negligence on the part ol' the railroad co1npan,\·. Defend-
ant\ own witw·~~e,; testiried that severe and r.onse-
quently dangerous slaek adion \l"il~ a ne<'es~ary incident 
to the 20 carlength movement and stop 1rhirh oe1'nrred. 
·when thi;.: evidence is coupled to the fact that the move-
ment awl stop eould have easily and pmcticnlly been 
avoided by bringing the curs to the train rathc·e than 
thr train to the cars, it can be ~een that a sub-
stantial part of plaintiff's case was eliminated by the 
instruction. We call attention to the case of Bosto-n. & 
.1lain Hailrorrd CnWJ#llllf r. Jferch, 156 F. 2d 10!;1, 111 
(1 C:C.A. Ccr. den. Oct. 28, 1946, G7 ~- Ct. 124), where 
the court held that whenever there i:-; a11 evidentiary 
basis for a finding that more could have been done to 
promote the safety of employees, a jury question is 
eo:tablished on the issue of negligence. 
'l'hc instruction also does violence to 1.he dodrine 
of res ipsa loquitur. Plainti rr alleged res ipsa in his 
('OII!plaint (R. 2). The trial court properly ino:tructed 
on re~ ip::!a in Instruction 7\o. 1± and told U1e jury in 
effect that severe slack action inadequatE'iy explained 
would warrant a finding of negligence. 
The cases mpport submission or res ipsa loquitur 
to the ,jury. Tn Kan::;as City Sourhern flaihW_i! Company 
r-. J1/'fis (Fifth Circuit, Apr. 6, 1956), 2:1~ F. 2rl 267, 
GO A.L.R.. ~rl fi:!S. Certiorary denied by the llnited States 
Supreme Court, 35~ U.S. 8:13, l L. Ed. 2d 53, 77 :::\. Ct. 
-19, a sudden extraordinarily violent jerk oeeurrcd caus-
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ing plaintiff':; injuries. 'l'Jte doctrine of rc\,; ipsa loquitur 
was held applicable in the following language: 
·•We think that the learned di.i!trict court 
properly submitted the issue of negligence to the 
jurv under the dortrine of 'res ipsa loquitur' as 
that rloetrine iii applied in action:-: arising under 
the :F'ederal Employers' l.iabilily Act and other 
federal laws. 'l'hc instant ca.'W i:-;, we think. a 
stronger one for tl1e application of the so-called 
res ipsa loquitur doctrine than was the J csio-
nowski ca~e. supra. There the claimed negligence 
of the dceeased brakeman might have be-en the 
;;ole cause of the derailmen, ·with no other negli-
gence on the part of tl1e railroad. Here, the 
most that could be claimed against the plaintiff 
i;.; hi<~ failure to ad after being infonned of an 
improper distribution of the load primarily 
brought about by other employees. 'l'he plaintiff 
had no connection 11 i th maintP.nanee of the brake> 
or brake line, or 11 ith the handling of the brakeR 
in making the ;.;top. I le was entitled to ~over 
if his injurr re8ulted 'in ,,-hole or in part from 
the negligence of any of the ... employeeg of 
such carrier, or h_,- rpa;..on of any defect or _in. 
suffieiency. due to its negligence, in i1;.; ... equip--
ment.' 45 L1SCA §51. In tJw present ra>'P, onre 
tire jury found a sudden stopping and an unusual 
joH or jar from whieh they inferred ncglip.·ence, 
such neglig-ence could not be C'lmrgeable solely 
to tJ1e plaintiff. If negligent a1 all, his negli-
gence 11·as contributory. not barring a rerovef\ 
but C'alling for a diminution of daumc;P:-:. --±:1 rSC.-\ 
§ 53." . 
In Instrudion Ko. :W the jur)- i>< informM that slack 
al'tion, en•11 1 hough sevf'n•. does llOt in and of it~C'lf. 
1 
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establi"'h negligence on the part of the railroad. But 
Imtruction );o. 1-J. prO}JCrly told the- jury that 11/j.ex-
plained severe slack action would support a finding of 
negligence. The two instructions are in('onsistent and 
confusing, and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur war; 
lost to plaintiff in the shuffle. The- burden was placed 
on plaintiff of proving that t.hc i<f'\'l'l"c o:lack action was 
negligently caused. The burden should have been on 
defendant under res ipsa of explaining the severe slack 
action on a non-negligent basis. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR BY GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 23. 
For eonvcnience of the Court Instruction ~o. 23 is 
herein set forth; 
'·Before you can find the Railroad negligent 
in this rase you must. find that. the engineer 
operating the train failed t.o i]o what an ordinary 
wndcot engineer would have done under the cir" 
cu mstances." 
Instruction Xo. :~n io: defendant's requested Instruc-
tion No. 1:;. This instruction contains the same vice 
discussed in Point II [ wherein attention is called to a 
eombination of fnrts; f.ir~t, that. under defendant's t~.~~li­
mony violent and severe c;lark action at the end of the 
train was a necessary and unavoidable result of moving 
a long train a distance of 18 to 20 carlengt-hs; and se•·ond, 
the fact t.hat the movement it~elf could have been prac-
tically and simply avoidP..d; and third, that t.he decision 
to make the movement and the stop was made by \Vonna-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
cott and Serassio and not by the plaintiff. Instruction 
No. :2:1 eliminates from plaintiff's rase any contention 
that "\Vonnaeott and Scrassio were negligent i11 decifug 
to make a movement which would involve umwcessary 
and unusual danger to plaintiff. This theory of liability 
was properly pleaded by plaintiff where it \IUS alleged 
that the stop was unnecessarily violent and not rea~on­
ably to be expected. 
If a jury in the exercise of it,; broad latitude as the 
fact finder could find that the sWp involved an unreason-
able risk of harm, and that the stop was unnecessary, 
defendant's negligence in making the stop at all would 
be a proper jury issue. 
See in support of plaintiff';, position Boston & M. 
R. H. v. Meech, supra, Wilkrrsotl r. JlcCarthy et al .. 
336 U.S. 53, 69 S. Ct. 413, reversing Utah Supreme Court. 
187 P. 2d 188, and Murphy r. BosfOtl & Jlai-ue R. R., 65 
N.E. 2d 923. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJCDlCIAL 
ERROR BY GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 24. 
For the convenience of the Court Instru('tion :So. 
24 is herein set forth: 
"Xegligencp on the part of anyone i~ not to 
be inferred fron~ t~w mere faet that the plaintiff 
may have hren mJured, and the mcre fru:t tl1at 
the plai11tiff may have been injured i:; not evi-
deiJCe in and of itself of negligence on the part 
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of the defendant, nor of eontributory negligence 
on the part of the plaintiff. Xegligence, iJ any, 
and eontributol'}' negligence, if any, must he 
proved by a preponderance of the evidenee in 
this cao:e." 
Instruction Xo. 24 nm~t also be considered in the 
hght of the fact that this is a res ipsa loquitur ease. 
In::~truction l\o. 24 tells the jm·~ that the n1cre l'act that 
plaintiff may have been injmed is not "c\'idcnee in and 
of it~elf of ncgligenC'c" on t.he part of defendant . .At no 
time has plaintiff elairned that the fad plaintiff was 
injured est(~bli·shed negligence. Plaintiff's contention 
wa~, and is, that the fact he was injured on the caboose 
is .,·,nne ct:i'dence indiml ing the violence of the slack ac-
tion. The violenec ol tlw ::;lack is a fact to be established 
in determining whether defendant was negligent. 
The law on thi.~ point is stated m 38 American 
Jurispruilence beginning at. page 985, m the following 
language: 
""\Vhile it is true thal simply because an acd-
dent has occurred, negligence is not to be pre-
mmed, ;,till, in drtennining the question of negli-
gence, the fad that an a~cidcnt has o~curred may 
he and should be taken into consideration, in con-
nection with all otl1er raet:B and circum~tancrs of 
the ca!ie, for the purpo~e of determining \\·hether 
in faet there was negligence. Negligence may be 
inferred from circumstanc.:s omrronnding the in-
;jury, if not from the fact of the injury itself." 
[n the footnote at page 9S5 of 38 Americ(Jn ,]llri.,·-
pnrdenl'f' appears the following ~upported statE'mcnt: 
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•·Xo general rule can be lai? dow!1 that th.e 
mere olwurrence of an accident JS or 1:0 not RUI-
ficient prima facic proof of actionable negligem,e. 
,._ ~ ~ Griffin v. Boston & A. R. Co-., l!S }fa~.'-
143, 19 N. E. 166, 1 hR.A.. 698, 12 Am. St. ReJJ. 
526. 
''Kegligence, like any other fact, may be in-
fcn-cd from the cinmmstances, and the ease may 
be such that though there he no positive proof 
that the defendant has been guilty of any neglert 
of duty, the inference of negligence would be ir-
resi~:;table. Bamowsky v. Helson, 89 .1lieh. 523, 
50 X. W. 989, 15 L.H.A. 3:1." 
'l'hc prinriple that the happening of the aceidcnt may 
be proper proof of neglig<>nee -waH recognized h~- thio 
Court in Penin r. r'nion Paei_fic H. Co., 59 l"tah 1, 201 
P. 405. IT1 the Perrin msr the happening of the acridcnt 
and the facts surrounding it were• found to be sufficient 
to support a verdict for plaintiff. See al;:;.o: Patrir/; 
Wetter r. The AfcJ,ison, Ti,fJPka nnd Sant11 Fe Hp. Cu .. 
277 Ill. App. 215; Orri"" 1". ChiWf!O. R. 1. & F. H11. Cv .. 
(Mo.) :?14 S.W. 125; 8outhm1 Hp. Co. c. Smith (Ala.) 
221 Ala. 273, US S. 22,-:t; Hankins L RPimer.,_ S6 \"ellr. 
307, 125 :\T.\V. 516; Pa-ulse11 L MeA roy Rrrwiug Co., :!~!l 
Ill. App. 605; Grauer r. Alabama Grfaf SoufliPrll R. Cu .. 
209 Ala. 568,96 S. 915: and HackleJJ 1". c'-·'oulhern Pnt-iii< 
Co., (Cal.) --1-:'i P. 2d -±47. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT CQ;\r.:>IJTTED PREJl"DICIAL 
ERROR BY GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 'o'l. 
For t.Jw eonvenienee of thP Conrt Illf'trnetion \"n. 
21 is herein ~rt forti!: 
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"If you find that the engineer made an inde-
pendent application of the brakes, that l'aet, if 
yon 60 find, does not in and of itsell estahli~h 
negligence on the part of the Railroad. Before 
you can find negligence on the rmrt of tJ1e !{ail-
road, you mm;t find by a preponderance of Uw 
evidence, that avplying the independent air brakes 
to stop as signaled by the brakeman Rerm;~io, 
consi it.uted negligenr.c and failure to exercise 
reasonable care." 
[nstruction Ko. 21 i,; defendant'::; requested Instruc-
tion Xo. l!i (R.. :2:1). The fallacy of the instruetion can 
best be ~een by resort to the evidence. Defendant's own 
witnesse,; tcstil'icd that an application of the iTJdependent 
brakes would be a departure from c.'Ustom and practice, 
would result in ex(·e~.~ive slack action with resultant 
violent run-in of ~lack and danger to employees on the 
rear of the train. Defendant's position was that the 
independent air wa.~ not used in making tho fltop. We 
call attention to the tf'stimony ol' engineer Kroescher 
at R. ~~1, ~9~: 
"Q. Now, 11hcn .1ou are operating a string of 
cars in a long train, .:\lr. Kroescher, what 
is the usual brake that you m;cf 
·· \. \Ve generally use the service applieation. 
"Q. And why do you usc the service appli(·ntion1 
"\ So you can ,;top the train. 
"Q. With a long fltring of carfl, arc you able to 
stop the train in a flhort distmJcc with inde-
pendent brakefl? 
"A. Not- no. 
·'Q. Why not! 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 
··A. Well, it wiU cam;e se·vere slack acti·on, if 
?JOU· 1J.~e the inrhpendtmf ulone." 
Kroescl1er went on to testify that he used the auto. 
matic rather than the independent brakes in making th 
stop (R. 296). lie also kstified that the use of the 
automatic brakes was the customary and proper pro. 
ccdure (R. 295, 305). On cross-examination Kroescher 
testified that me of the independent brakes would cause 
much more violent slack ad.ion than use of the traill 
brakes (R. 308), &nd that he wouldn't use the independent 
brakes for reasons of o:afely to personnel on the rear of 
the train (R. 309). 
With the foregoing e\'identiary background, thE 
court states in Instruction No. 21 that PIE'Il though the 
jury believed that the independent rather than the trair< 
brakes were used, thi,.; fad in and of it~elf would not 
establish negligence on the part of the railroad cowpany. 
In the light of defendant's 011·n evidence tl1t> u.•p oi 
independent ai1· b~· the engineer would be negligence as 
a matter of law. 'l'his i1:1 true hef'amt> it i,; agreed on aU 
sides that use of independent air would (1) <'alllif' un-
usual and Ulllleces,;ar~· violence of ~lark artion at tlw 
rear of the train, and(:!) he a departure from customar). 
noru1al and safe railroading- procedures. 
POINT VII. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR WHEN IT STRUCK THE ENTIRE TESTIMONY 
OF THE WITNESS PAUL FRANK THOSIAS 
'Yiine~~ Thomas teo:tified on behalf of plaintiff that 
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he wa~ in (}w ,Yard offiee at I he time of the oecUI'I"C·w'P 
(R. :!til, :!II:!). The yard office i~ about 50 to 100 feet 
from the eastbound mainline track \R. 264). He was 
~mnewhat un(•crtain as to whether he had actually ~een 
the movement of the train on the eastbound mainline 
track (R. :!fi-1-, 26.1). However, he testified that he heard 
"a violent run-in," and again rharactcrized the noise he 
heard as ''a terriffic crashing, in other words" (R 265). 
He also testified that he mw the caboose of the tmin 
which was almost in front of the yard offi<'e (R 2fl6). 
A short Lime later Thoma~ saw plaintiff enter the yard 
office (R. 263). 
'J'he court instructed the jury as follows: 
''6 (a) You are imtructed that you are to 
entirely disregard the testimony of the witne::;,; 
Thomas and are not to con:o.ider ~aid testimony 
in arriving at your deci~ion in this case." 
Counsel for plaintil'f took exception to the giving 
of said instruction (R. 345). 
The reason given hy the court. in exduding ~aid 
te~timony r,.an be found in his ronmtcnt wherein the 
court stated; "\Veil, it takes rat.hcr a strong a:o.sumption 
to say that the l'rash he said he heard had anything to 
do with tlli;; train or this event." (R. 272). 
That eYidenee is admist;able even though it may 
im·nlve a measure of speculation ha~ long been the law 
in Federal Employers' Uabllity Act cases. As was stated 
by this Court in Co ray v. Ogden Union R<1-!1lway & JJepot 
Cnm pam], 1 ~() P 2d 342, at Page :J-4--l: 
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'·If there is evidence from wl1ich the jury, 
as reasonable lllen, can find the e.ristem·e of a 
disputed fact, it is not speculation Hiinply becaust· 
there is equally strong evidence from which they 
could have arrived at an opposite conclusion. The 
law of the "Gniierl States covering thi::; situation 
is as stated by Mr. Justice Douglas in the ease of 
Ellis v. L"nion Pacific Railroad Co., 67 S. Ct. 591<. 
600: 
'''l'he choice of confliding versions of the 
·way the accident happened, the decision a~ to 
which witnc::;s was telling the truth, the inferrwe~ 
to be drawn from unru1d·rorerted a.~ ~rell as con-
troverted fads, ano questions for the j1ay. 'l'en-
nant v. Peoria & P. TT. R. Co., 3:Zl r.S. 29, 64 
S. Ct. 409, 88 L. Ed. 520: Lavender v. Kuru, 
supra, (3:Z7 P.S. 645, 6G S. Ct. 1-±0, 90 L. Ed. 916). 
Once there i~ a reasonable basis in the record 
for concluding that there was negligence which 
rnused the injury it ii' irrelevant that fair-minded 
mf'u might reach a different. conclusion. For then 
it would he an invasion of the jury';: function for 
an appellate court to draw contrary i.nferen~e' 
or to conclude that a different conclusion would 
be more reasonable. Lavender Y. Kurn, supra. 
W.!/ r.s. at page G .• ,:?. 6G S. Ct at page 7-±:1 (90 
LEd. 91G)." 
And as \\'a~ :;nid lo.' ~Jr .• Jmticf' :\[urph~- in Lorrud,·• 
v. K urn, 3~7 U.~. ii4J. 66 S. Ct. I +tl: 
''Tt i~ no answer to :;ay that the jm·y·~ verdict 
involved SJH.'<'ulatiml and eonjf'eture. Whenever 
fact,; nrc in dispute or tire eridel/(e is suth 1/wt 
_fai1·-wiuded 1111'11 lllfi.IJ rlnnc di_ifrreut iuji'I'I'Hrt'··. 
a measun• of speeulation and conjecture is re-
quired on the pal't of those \dh,~t' dut' it i~ to 
settle tlw disputf' by rhoosi.ng what seen~s to them 
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tbh bl ·r" o r. t e most rea;;ona e m erence. 
1 n ihe ca::;e at bar the jury should have been allowed, 
from the proximity of time and location, to infer that 
the run-in of slack hearo:l by 'l'homas >va.;; on plajntiff'o; 
train, and from the nature of the ~ound, that it was 
unmmally violent. "\Vhen the trial <'onrt disapproved 
and excluded this testimony a c;hadow wa.'l placed over 
plaintiff's entire case. 
The trial court ·waR not content v .. ith exduding the 
evidence regarding mund of the slack hut excluded the 
entire testimony of Thomas. Thoma:>' description of 
plaintiff shortly after the accident was as follows: ""\Yell, 
I don't recall ·what he looked like exactly. Seemed, though, 
he walked in and he \I'H~ white and he had one arm-
don't recall which elbow was torn out and he wa.'\ sick, 
or he said he was sick." (R. 26.1). Thi,; evidence indir.ated 
a ~erious injury immediately follo-wing the run-in of 
~lar_ok. It was evidt>nCE' of pain and ~uffcring and was 
aho ,;upportive of plaintiff'" dairu that hi,; later di::>-
covered ruptured dise 1'13:3 ranscd b.v the accident. It will 
be rer.alled def'endant denied that plaintiff was injured 
and contended that the di6c pathology had nothing to 
do with plaintiff's accident. For example, note de-fense 
counsel'~ ero~s-exnmination of Dr. Robert Lamb (H. 
101, 102): 
"Q. In other word,;, Doctor, when thi<~ con-
dition gets to the breaking point, the straw that 
breaks the back, t.hat can cause the ,;ymptoms to 
begin to occur, 1s that ri_ghtl 
"A. In some cases. 
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"Q. People mlling over awkwardly in bed 
with a back like that, they will start having pain l 
"A. T have seen it from people who arf 
bending ovet' to ltwc their shoes or going through 
some wotion that t h e ;.· do-n't ordinarily go 
through." 
"Q. Doctor, is it not true that people with 
a bac·k like this as they get a little older, why 
that baC'k will have to be corrected without injury 
si1nply because it develope~ and the condition be-
<:omes worse! 
"A. Ye~. "' * * " 
Again, on recross, defense counsel attempted to in-
ject doubt as to whether plaintiff was injured at the 
time of the accident (R. 115). 
"Q. In other words, Doctor, you are asswn-
ing that the plaintiff is corr<:'dl~- telli1t~ you that 
he has never had any pain in his baek prior to 
this time and that the first time he ever had pall 
in hif< ha<'k was aftE'r thi~ areident ocf.'urred at 
Provof 
''A. 
"Q. 
to read1 
"A. 
Yes, that \m~ the history that I-
And you have to n~~UllW that to be trut 
tl1e dinp:no~io; tllat you rearhed. 
..,- ,. 
l E'~. 
The te><timony of 'l'homa,; wn.~ lllaterlul and pro· 
bative on tlw i~~nt>o< of neglige-nre, cau~ntion, and dam· 
age. One or more of tlle><E' is~ues wu~ 1-esolved against 
plaintiff by tlw jur~·. T'nquestionahly plaintiff wa> 
prejudiced hy Instruction X o. G k 
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CONCijFSlON 
Plaintiff re;.;pcdfully submits that the instructions 
given to the jury by the trial court are riddled with 
prejudicial error. ln brief s1m1mary these instructions: 
1. Erroneously required plaintiff to expect and 
guard agaimt unexpected and unanticipated negligence 
of the defendant. 
1.. Resurrected the outlawed defense of assumption 
of risk where it required plaintiff to assume the risks 
of unexpected negligent stops. 
3. Erroneously deprived plaintiff of the right to 
recover for a negligently r-aused severe stop if it was 
expected, thereby re.surreeting contributory negligence 
as a complete defense. 
4. /<Jnoneously deprived plailltiff of the right to 
rooover for a negligently 1mexpected stop if there wru; a 
nonnal type of braking applieation. 
u. .l<jrroneously deprived plaintiff of the right to 
recover under the Doctrine of Res Ips.a Loquitur. 
G. l<'.rroneou;,ly deprived plainf1ff of the right to 
recover even though he proved that other members of 
his crPw had made a ,;top which involved an unrca~on­
abl~> risk of harm and which ·was unnecessary. 
i. Erroneously instructed the jury that use by the 
f'11ginee-r of the independent brakes was noi enough to 
support a finding of negligence. 
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8. Erroneously deprived plaintiff of the advantagp 
of important probative evidence when it excluded the 
testimony of Thomas. 
Any of the foregoing enors individually would war-
rant reversal of the case. Collectivel;. they demonstrat€ 
a denial to plaintiff of his fundamental right to a fair 
and impartial trial according to law. 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that tills ca.<e 
should be reversed and renmnded to tl1e District Court 
fGr a new trial. 
Hcspretfully submitted, 
RAI\TLJNGS. \Y.ALLACE. 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
By Wayne L. Black 
Cottnsel _for Appe/fa11f 
5:m Judge Building 
Salt Lake City. Uah 
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